This paper reports the results of a unique experiment designed to assess the impact of last-sale trade reporting on the liquidity of BBB corporate bonds. We find that increased transparency has either a neutral or positive effect on market liquidity depending on trade size. Measures of trading activity such as daily trading volume and number of transactions per day suggest that increased transparency does not lead to greater trading interest. We find that for all but the smallest trade size group, spreads on bonds whose prices become more transparent decline relative to bonds that experience no transparency change. However, we find no effects of transparency for very infrequently traded bonds. The observed decrease in transactions costs is consistent with investors' ability to negotiate better terms of trade with dealers once the investors have access to broader bond pricing data.
Introduction
Although larger than the market for U.S. Government or municipal bonds, the corporate bond market historically has been one of the least transparent securities markets in the U.S, with neither pre-trade nor post-trade transparency. Corporate bonds trade primarily over-the-counter, and until recently, no centralized mechanism existed to collect and disseminate post-transaction information. This structure changed on July 1, 2002, when the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) began a program of increased post-trade transparency for corporate bonds, known as the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system. As part of this structural change, only a selected subset of bonds initially became subject to public dissemination of trade information. The resulting experiment enables us to observe the effects of increased post-trade transparency on market liquidity in a controlled setting.
With the July 2002 introduction of TRACE, all NASD members were required for the first time to report prices, quantities, and other information for all secondary market transactions in corporate bonds.
1 However, the trade information collected by the NASD was publicly disseminated only for very large (issue size greater than $1 billion) and high credit quality (Arated and above) bonds. Some market participants and regulators initially were concerned that public dissemination of this data for smaller and lower grade bonds might have an adverse impact on liquidity. Therefore, dissemination of trade information for bonds rated BBB+ and below and for issues sizes under $1 billion was to be phased in later, pending a series of studies of the likely impact of increased transparency.
1 Prior to TRACE, transaction information for high yield bonds was collected by the NASD under the Fixed Income Pricing System (FIPS), but only hourly trading summaries for a sample of 50 high yield bonds were publicly disseminated. See Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) and Alexander, et al, (2000) for further description of the FIPS reporting requirements.
The first study, which is the subject of this paper, involved a controlled experiment designed to test the impact of transparency on liquidity for the BBB bond market. Using nonpublic TRACE trade data for all BBB bonds from July 2002 to February 2003, we selected 120 bonds for which the NASD began public dissemination of trade data on a real-time basis.
2 These bonds fell into two groups, 90 more actively traded bonds and 30 relatively inactive bonds, enabling us to examine transparency issues across the liquidity spectrum. 3 We simultaneously identified a control sample of non-disseminated bonds. This provided us the opportunity to conduct a true experiment by altering the transparency properties of these securities on a real-time basis. By inter-temporally comparing the trades of the disseminated bonds to themselves before and after they were made transparent, and by comparing the trades of the disseminated bonds to those of the matching but non-disseminated bonds, our experiment allows us to gauge the effects of transparency on bond liquidity in a systematic and controlled framework.
The NASD began public dissemination of trades in the 120 selected BBB bonds on April 14, 2003. We were provided not only with data for the 120 disseminated bonds, but the entire universe of BBB rated corporate bonds, whether disseminated or not. After applying some
filters, the dataset we analyze for our study consists of all trades from July 8, 2002 to February 27, 2004 for 5,503 BBB-rated corporate bonds that have an original issue size between $10 million and $100 million.
We find that depending on trade size, increased transparency has either a neutral or positive effect on market liquidity, as measured by trading volume or estimated bid-ask spreads.
Measures of trading activity, such as daily trading volume and number of transactions per day,
show no relative increase, indicating that increased transparency does not lead to greater trading interest in our sample period. The relatively long (10 months) post-transparency period suggests that this lack of increased trading volume is not due to the newness of the market changes. For all but the smallest trade size group, spreads decrease for bonds whose prices become transparent by more than the amount that spreads decline for our control bonds. This effect is strongest for intermediate trade sizes: for trades between 51 and 100 bonds, relative to their controls, spreads on the 90 disseminated bonds fall by either 21 or 42 basis points (per $100 face value) more, depending on the spread estimation method. The decrease in transaction costs for such trades is consistent with investors' ability to negotiate better terms of trade with dealers once the investors have access to broader bond pricing data. We do not find any change for very thinly-traded bonds. Thus, overall, we find that increased transparency has a neutral or positive effect on liquidity.
Since pre-trade quote data does not exist for this market, we estimate the impact of transparency on spreads using two different techniques. Our dataset identifies trades by individual dealers, which allows us to first measure spreads directly by measuring the round-trip cost of a dealer purchase from a customer followed by a sale of that bond by the same dealer to another customer (a dealer round-trip or DRT) within a specified time period. This DRT method is similar to that used by Green, Hollifield and Schurhoff (2004) and Biais and Green (2005) in their studies of municipal bonds, except that we use additional information on the identity of the dealer. A distinct advantage of this approach is that it provides a measure of bond spreads that is simple to interpret and is not dependent on assumptions used to model spreads.
Using this method, for all BBB bonds we find that for round-trips that occur within one day, spreads average $2.37 (median $2.25) per $100 face value for trades up to 10 bonds. These costs fall monotonically to $0.47 (median $0.25) per $100 for trades of 1000 bonds or more. For both the 90 disseminated bonds and their non-disseminated controls, we find for all trade size groups that customer transactions costs fall from the pre-to post-dissemination time period.
4 However, our cross-sectional analysis, which controls for additional bond characteristics affecting spreads, shows that spreads are lower when the bonds are disseminated, reaching a maximum decline of over 45 basis points for intermediate size trades.
We also estimate spreads using a second methodology similar to that in Warga (1991) and Schultz (2001) , based on regression estimates of the difference between transaction prices and the previous day's estimated bid price as reported by Reuters. The regression-based results, which utilize all trading data over this time period, support the results found using the more direct DRT method. For the more actively traded bonds, transparency is associated with an additional decrease, over and above market wide changes in costs, of between 21 and 29 basis points per $100 face value for disseminated bonds for trade sizes less than 250 bonds. This effect diminishes to 14 basis points for trade sizes from 250 to 1000 bonds, and becomes insignificant for trade sizes greater than 1000 bonds. However, for the additional disseminated sample of 30 less active BBB bonds, we find no significant effect of transparency either overall or for any trade size group. An important difference of our work is that rather than focusing on the cross sectional determinants of trading costs, we focus on the BBB transparency experiment. For all other credit ratings besides BBB, all bonds of a given rating and issue size are either subject to dissemination under TRACE at that time or not. The BBB market is the only case in which we can simultaneously observe bonds of the same credit rating and matched on characteristics such as issue size and trading activity, some of which are disseminated and some of which are not.
Further, both regulators and market participants believed the market for the highest rated and very large issues, which are less information sensitive and also have more close substitutes, would not behave in the same manner as lower rated or smaller issues (hence the willingness to begin dissemination for bonds rated above BBB sooner).
6
Our paper also differs from these working papers in the methods used to estimate trading costs. Our regression-based estimates are broadly similar to the approaches used in these papers and used by Schultz, and the magnitude of the trading cost estimates we find for the largest trades (greater than 1000 bonds) in the TRACE dataset matches the 27 basis point estimate reported by Schultz. We also calculate spreads directly using our DRT measure, which does not utilize any data external to the TRACE data, or any econometric models for estimating bond prices for bonds that are infrequently traded. Our approach also allows us to disentangle any non-linear effects, such as those due to overall trading frequency, which we find to be an important determinant of the impact of transparency.
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of transparency on market liquidity is ambiguous, as noted in Madhavan (1995) , Pagano and Roell (1996) , and Naik, Neuberger and Viswanathan (1999).
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Greater transparency may reduce adverse selection and encourage uninformed investors to enter the trading arena. At the same time it may make it harder for market makers to supply liquidity. In a world with post-trade reporting, a market maker can be in a difficult bargaining position to unwind her inventory following a large trade, leading her to charge a premium for this risk. Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999) provide experimental evidence showing that opening spreads are larger but subsequent spreads are tighter when ex-post 6 The disseminated bonds considered by Edwards et al. (2005) and Bessembinder et al. (2005) include investment grade bonds with issue size over $1 billion, which were disseminated upon the July 2002 start of TRACE, as well as the 50 high yield bonds disseminated under TRACE to provide continuity for bonds previously reported under the FIPS system. The set of 50 high yield bonds disseminated under TRACE were not selected randomly; bonds disseminated as of July 2002 under TRACE were already disseminated under FIPS (thus we would observe the impact of the incremental transparency). Further, subsequent revisions to the list of 50 disseminated high yield bonds specifically selected bonds which were among the most actively traded in the market, presenting sample selection concerns. 7 Bias, Glosten and Spatt (2004) provide an overview of these arguments.
transparency is enhanced. Resolving this debate empirically has been difficult because there are very few settings that in practice allow us to observe the impact of a change in transparency.
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The introduction of the TRACE system, and specifically the experiment we have structured using the BBB market, provides such an opportunity to observe these effects.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the TRACE system and the data used in the study. The next two sections present our empirical results on transparency and liquidity. Section 3 considers the effect of transparency on trading frequency and volume.
Section 4 analyzes the effect of increased transparency on bond spreads results using our two different estimation methods. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
Data Description and Design of the Experiment
We analyze all secondary market trades in 5,503 BBB-rated corporate bonds for the time period July 8, 2002 through February 27, 2004 . Our dataset includes all bond trades during this time, with the exception of a comparatively small amount of trading activity on the NYSE's Automated Bond System (ABS), which is not reported through TRACE. NASD (2004) estimates that 99.9% of trading is transacted over-the-counter and is therefore included in our data.
Selection of bonds for dissemination and for non-disseminated control groups
The selection of BBB bonds for dissemination under TRACE was based on transactions that occurred in the period from July 8, 2002 through January 31, 2003 ("the selection period").
Our selection process excluded convertible bonds, bonds from banks, and bonds with unusual 8 A notable exception examining changes in post-trade transparency is Gemmill (1996) , who finds that dealer spreads were not affected by changes in the trade disclosure regime of the London Stock Exchange.
features. We also eliminated BBB bonds with an issue size over $1 billion, as their prices were already disseminated as of July 1, 2002, and bonds with an issue size less than $10 million.
Because Hotchkiss, Jostova and Warga (2005) indicate that there is an abnormal amount of trading in the first few months following issuance, we did not include newly issued bonds. We also excluded bonds with less than one year remaining to maturity to avoid reaching the maturity date during our measurement period.
Because of concerns about the statistical power of our tests, we chose two groups of bonds for dissemination based on their frequency of trading in the selection period. First, we identified 90 pairs of bonds, matching on industry, trading activity (average trades per day) during the selection period, bond age, and time to maturity; we required that these bonds traded at least once per week on average during the selection period. As pairs of bonds were created, one bond was randomly chosen to be disseminated and the other was assigned to a nondisseminated control group (the "matching" control bonds). We then identified an additional sample of 30 thinly-traded bonds for dissemination, requiring only that the bonds traded on average at least once every two weeks but less than once every two days on average during the selection period. The 30 thinly-traded bonds trade so infrequently that it is not possible to construct a bond-by-bond matched control sample for empirical analysis. In total, 120 BBB bonds (90 actively traded and 30 thinly-traded) were made subject to dissemination under TRACE on April 14, 2003.
As Davies and Kim (2004) note, creating a control set from matching pairs is at times optimal, while at other times a larger control portfolio may be optimal. Using the matching approach, results may be sensitive to the particular choice of bonds for the control portfolio.
Using a broader control portfolio, however, will include more bonds that are quite dissimilar to We use a similar procedure to construct a control portfolio for the 30 thinly traded bonds.
This produces a non-disseminated control portfolio consisting of 1,919 bonds, whose average daily trade count in the selection period ranges from 0.1 to 0.4. By comparing the 30 thinly traded bonds to their corresponding non-disseminated control portfolio, we obtain meaningful results for the effects of transparency on these bonds
Characteristics and Trading Activity of Disseminated and Control Bonds
Industry categories and other bond characteristics for each group of bonds, as well as for the full set of BBB bonds, are described in Table 1 . The data for the full set of all BBB bonds indicates the dominance of financial firms in this market: over 44% of all of the bonds are issued by financial firms, although many other industries are also represented. Subsequent results using control portfolios are insensitive to the removal of financial firms from those portfolios. Table 1 also shows that (by construction) the matching non-disseminated bonds have the same distribution across industries as the 90 disseminated bonds. half that (7.3 days). This may be due to dealers' desire to maintain low inventory positions in bonds that are thinly traded, causing them to quickly sell a bond they have recently bought from a customer.
The trading activity statistics for the 90 disseminated bonds and the matching nondisseminated bonds also shows a close match. The median average daily volume is 1,300 for the 90 disseminated bonds and 1,212 for the non-disseminated matching bonds. Even closer, the median average daily trade count is 0.8 for the 90 disseminated bonds and 0.9 for the matching bonds, as is the percent of days traded (38.3% for the disseminated, and 38.9% for the matching), the average days between trades (3.7 for both groups), and the maximum days between trades (21.0 and 21.5, respectively). Both groups are noticeably more active than the bonds in the non-disseminated control portfolio. Turning to the 30 thinly traded bonds, the dollar volume of trade for bonds in their non-disseminated control portfolio is lower than for the 30 disseminated bonds, but the trading activity is otherwise similar.
Effect of increased transparency on trade frequency and trading volume
In this section, we measure the impact of transparency by analyzing the change in the level of trading activity before and after the bonds become transparent in April 2003. As discussed above, it is not clear whether the introduction of transparency will be associated with an increase or with a decline in this measure of liquidity. We consider two measures of trading activity: average daily trading volume and average number of trades per day. To allow time to adjust to the new reporting regime, we exclude the two week period surrounding the start of dissemination of data. All results in this and the following sections are similar when we restrict our analysis to the 6 month window surrounding the 4/13/2003 start of dissemination. Even though aggregate bond volume is generally unaffected by increased transparency in our sample, it is possible that investors, rather than dealers, are in fact drawn to bonds with higher transparency. Table 4 considers this possibility by repeating the analysis but excluding all inter-dealer trades. The table is analogous to Table 3 and most results are similar. Both panels indicate that there is no change in trading activity at conventional levels of significance that is related to the increase in transparency.
The above results indicate no measurable effect of increased transparency on these two trading activity measures of bond liquidity. However, it is possible that changes in liquidity are related to other traits of the bond. Though our sample of 90 matching non-disseminated bonds controls for some of these characteristics, the control portfolios are created based only on trading frequency and so do not. We therefore use a multivariate regression to test whether increased transparency is related to changes in bond trading activity, controlling for cross-sectional differences in bond characteristics. The results of the regression are shown in Table 5 . The independent variable in the regression is either average daily trading volume or average number of trades per day.
For the 90 disseminated bonds and their 90 matchers, bonds from larger bond issues have higher trading volume than bonds from smaller issues. Bond age is significantly negatively related to trading volume, as in Hotchkiss, Jostova and Warga (2005) . The coefficient on the Post-Dissemination Period Indicator is negative and significant at the 5% level, consistent with our univariate result that volume dropped for the later period. 9 However, the key variable of interest is the interaction variable for Disseminated Bonds in the Post-Dissemination Period. The coefficient on this interacted variable is statistically insignificant. Similarly, no effect is found for the change in average daily trade count.
This result is born out for the other bond groups as well.
In fact, across all six regressions in Table 5 , the coefficient on the Disseminated Bond in the Post-Dissemination
Period is significant only for the average daily volume regression for the 30 thinly traded bonds and their control sample, and then only at the 10% level. Taken together, this table and the two tables that precede it lead us to conclude that there appears to be no significant change in volume in BBB bonds that can be attributed to an increase in last sale transparency.
Effect of increased transparency on trading costs
Though transactions costs can have multiple components, perhaps the most important one for our purposes is the effective spread of the bond. This is the difference between what a customer pays when they buy a bond and what they receive if they sell the bond. The price difference is related to the dealer markup or profit on the trades. We prefer the term "spread" as markups can take on certain regulatory implications.
Section 4.1 reports estimates of spreads directly based on dealer round-trip trades.
Section 4.2 reports regression-based spread estimates using benchmark prices obtained from a third party data source (Reuters).
Estimation of spreads from dealer round-trip (DRT) trades
We take as a measure of transaction costs the difference between what a customer pays and receives for a fixed quantity of a bond. We estimate this measure by identifying instances where a certain dealer acquires a bond from a customer and then that same dealer subsequently sells the same bond to a different customer. By restricting the time between these two trades to be sufficiently short (e.g., one day or five days) that factors such as interest rate and credit changes are unlikely to change, the difference in these two prices is exactly the quantity we seek, the effective spread of the bond.
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To calculate this measure, we consider two cases for the duration of the dealer round-trip.
In the first, we require that the dealer completes the round-trip in one day, and in the second case we require the round-trip to be completed in five days. Though lengthening the round-trip window to five days permits exogenous factors to affect dealer spreads, it also allows a greater cross-section of trades to enter our sample. Table 6 The magnitude of the measured spreads, however, may not be as surprising when one simply looks at plots of transaction prices for a given bond. An example of such a plot for a short time interval is given for one of the 90 disseminated bonds in Figure 1 . This bond is in the bottom quartile of the 90 bond sample based on average daily trading volume. The observed price differences on trades occurring on the same or close days are strikingly large, even when we consider that the plot does not control for trade size. These plots also raise two important issues related to outliers in the data. First, when trades can sometimes occur at seemingly large spreads, it becomes difficult to infer whether a trade is a data error or a costly trade. Second, though our test statistics should not be driven by outliers, understanding the presence and behavior of the outliers themselves is an important part of understanding overall behavior in this market.
A cursory examination of the means and medians across both panels in Table 6 indicates that there is not much difference between examining one day and five day spreads. As the longer time period allows for significantly more observations (166,613 in total for one day versus 355,625 for five day round-trips), we focus on the five day round-trips throughout the remainder of this paper. However, we have estimated the tables below subject to the requirement that the trades must take place on the same day and find substantively similar results.
12 Table 6 also shows that spreads fall markedly as trade size increases. Panel B indicates that for institutional trades of over 1000 bonds, or $1 million face value, the median cost is only $.28 per $100 of face value. This is an 87% drop from the median cost for a trade of 10 or fewer bonds of $2.13 per $100. Spreads fall monotonically with increasing trade size. While this is consistent with high fixed costs of trade that are reflected in spreads for small transactions, it could also reflect an uniformed retail investor base that cannot effectively monitor dealer rent seeking, as in Green, et al. (2004) . Also consistent with Green, et al. is our finding that although dealers charge lower spreads for larger trades, they are also more apt to lose money on the trades.
For example, for trades from 250 to 1000 bonds, a dealer charges on average 57 basis points for the trade, but loses 298 basis points or more one percent of the time. Losses for smaller trades, when they occur, are much smaller.
The magnitude of our estimates can be compared to those of other studies. Edwards, et al. (2004) , using a different sample TRACE data, generally report lower trading costs. For example, their estimate of costs on small trades is roughly 40% lower than ours (approximately $1.60 versus our estimate of $2.30) for trades of 10 bonds or less. For larger trades, our median costs estimates do not fall below $0.25, which is substantially higher than the Edwards et al.
estimates. This is true even for the one day DRTs, for which there is little risk that an event such as a significant interest rate movements could affect our estimates. Given that the DRTs are observed more often for actively traded bonds, it is surprising that we find significantly higher overall costs. We attribute the difference to the use of our DRT method, versus Edwards et al.'s two stage econometric model. Bessembinder et al.'s (2005) post-TRACE cost estimates are closer to ours, though their analysis can be compared only to our very largest trade size group (> 1000 bonds), which accounts for less than 10% of our DRT observations (Panel B of Table 6 ).
We next apply our method of measuring trading costs to the question of whether liquidity changes when transparency increases. In Table 7 we report spreads separately for DRTs that occur in the pre-dissemination and post-dissemination periods. We eliminate trades that occur at negative spreads or at spreads over $5.00. Such trades are more likely to reflect instances where other factors, such as a firm specific event, cause a significant change in the bond's value. We report results only for the 90 disseminated bonds and their control groups; the additional 30 disseminated bonds contribute relatively few DRT observations because of their lower trading frequency.
For the 90 disseminated bonds, there is a significant decrease in the mean spread across all trade size groups, though the median change for the smallest trade size group is zero. For the 90 non-disseminated matchers, we also observe a decline in the mean and median spread, though the differences are not significant for intermediate sized trades. Finally, for the nondisseminated control portfolio, there is actually an increase in spreads at smaller trade sizes but significant decreases for larger trades. For smaller trades, the mean and median spreads for disseminated bonds are somewhat larger than for non-disseminated bonds, even in the predissemination period.
As in Tables 3 and 4 above, we use a "difference of differences" method to measure the relative change in spreads from the pre-to the post-dissemination period, controlling for changes in the trading environment. For example, for the 51-100 trade size bin, the mean spread for disseminated bonds decreases by $0.65 (from $1.37 to $0.73), while the mean for the matching non-disseminated bonds decreases only $0.24 (from $0.78 to $0.54.) The difference of these differences is (-0.65) -(-0.24) = -0.40, or a relative decrease in spread of 40 basis points (significant at the 5% level). Similarly, the mean spread for non-disseminated control portfolio falls only $0.08 (from $1.08 to $1.00). Relative to the control portfolio, the disseminated bonds have a decrease in spread of 57 basis points, which is significant at the 1% level.
The only case in Table 7 where we observe a significant increase in relative spreads is for the smallest trade size group (10 bonds or less). For these trades, we observe an increase in the mean spread of $0.36 relative to the 90 matching non-disseminated bonds (and a 0.56 basis point relative increase based on the median, which is not influenced by outliers). This result, however,
is not robust to the choice of control group as we observe a significant decline of $0.26 relative to the non-disseminated control portfolio. In all other size groups, the results based on the nondisseminated control portfolio are supportive of those based on the matching bonds. As noted in Biasis and Green (2005) , it is difficult to postulate a theory of why, when transparency increases, retail investors would face larger trading costs in small information-less trades, especially given that larger trades appear to benefit from the transparency. For intermediate size trades, we observe the largest relative decline in spreads.
Another possibility is that the effects of increased transparency depend on other traits of the bond. To control for cross-sectional differences in bond characteristics, we again use a multivariate regression to estimate whether increased transparency is associated with changes in spreads, controlling for bond characteristics. The results of these regressions are shown in Table   8 . The dependent variable in the regression is the five day DRT spread estimate. Table 8a reports results for the 90 disseminated bonds and their 90 non-disseminated matchers, while Table 8b reports results for the 90 disseminated bonds and the non-disseminated control portfolio.
The results in these tables are generally consistent with our univariate analysis. The results in both Tables 8a and 8b indicate that not including the effects of dissemination, the disseminated bonds as a group had higher spreads than non-disseminated bonds, and that spreads for all bonds fell from the pre-dissemination period to the post-dissemination period. To understand the impact of transparency on spreads, the key coefficient is that of the interacted variable, "disseminated bond in post-dissemination period". Table 8a indicates a relative decrease in spreads when bonds become disseminated, for all trade size bins except the smallest. Table 8b shows a decline relative to the non-disseminated control portfolio across all trade size groups. The impact of transparency appears greatest for intermediate sized trades (100 bonds), with a decline of -0.454 relative to the non-disseminated matching bonds and -0.549 relative to the non-disseminated control portfolio.
The regression results control for the DRT holding period, defined as the time (in days)
between the dealer's purchase from a customer and sale to a customer. As this time increases, it is more likely that the spread estimate is influenced by other market events. The positive significant coefficient for this variable may also reflect compensation to dealers for the risk of holding the bond over a longer time period. Interpretation of the other control variables is most useful for Table 8b using the non-disseminated control portfolio, which does not already match bonds based on characteristics. We find that spreads are higher as the interest rate risk (measured by time to maturity) of the bond increases, as the bond ages, and as the issue size falls. We also control for whether a bond has a disseminated "sibling", which occurs when there is another bond of the same issuer with an issue size greater than $1 billion. Because bonds over $1 billion are also disseminated under TRACE during this time period, such a bond might benefit from the transparency of its larger disseminated sibling. Alternatively, this variable may proxy for larger firms with complex capital structures and thus more public information available and lower trading costs. This effect is most pronounced for smaller trades, where bonds with disseminated siblings have lower estimated spreads.
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Finally, bonds that have been actively traded in the prior 30 days are also associated with higher trading costs (Table 8b) , though we find this result does not hold for the regressions comparing the 90 disseminated bonds to their 90 matching bonds (Table 8a) .
Regression-based estimates of spreads
A chief advantage to the estimation method used in the previous section is that provides a very direct and easily interpretable measure of spreads, using no data external to TRACE and not dependent on assumptions embedded in the modeling of spreads. Its chief drawback is that it only uses a portion of the data available, in that transactions must be part of a dealer round-trip as we have defined it. To address this concern, we examine regression-based spread estimates that utilize all of the trading data. 14 Effective spreads are estimated by regressing the difference between the transaction price for a customer and an estimated bid price on a dummy variable that equals one for customer buys and zero for customer sells:
[customer trade price -bid price] i = α 0 + α 1 D i Buy + ε i
The difficulty in implementing this approach is that we must use estimated rather than actually observed dealer bid prices. For this study, we use dealer bid prices reported by Reuters for the end of day prior to the transaction. Reuters bases these estimates on daily quotes obtained from individual dealers and largely does not use matrix prices. 15 Since the bid prices are updated daily 13 We also control for whether the bond is displayed on the NYSE's ABS, but do not report those results here, as trading on the ABS is relatively more important to the high yield market. Our coefficient estimates and our conclusions as to the impact of transparency under TRACE are not affected by this additional control variable. 14 Bessimbinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2005) note that their methodology, the methodology in Schultz (2001) , and that in Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2004) use broadly similar indicator variable regression approaches. The regression-based methodology in this paper also falls into this category. A significant difference of the Besseimbinder et al. methodology from ours is that they utilize econometric methods to account for the fact that the NAIC data is not time stamped, which is not necessary for the TRACE data. 15 Although there are a large number of outstanding investment grade corporate bond issues, there are only approximately 500 distinct issuers. Based on our conversations, Reuters estimates that their analysts obtain direct quotes from dealers for about 85% of these issuers. Warga and Welch (1993) stress the importance of using dealer by Reuters' analysts to reflect changes in treasury prices, equity prices, and other firm specific information, we do not need additional controls for changes in interest rates and related factors in our regressions.
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To eliminate obvious data errors, we exclude observations from our regressions if the difference between the trade price and the Reuters bid price (our dependent variable) is greater than 20. We also winsorize regressions at 5% to reduce the influence of outliers (results are invariant to other percentage cutoffs). Further, transactions are excluded if the end of day
Reuters bid price for the transaction date has changed more than $0.50 from the previous day's closing bid as reported by Reuters, since in these cases the prior day's ending bid price is less likely to be a useful estimate of the bid quote at the time of the transaction. Results (not reported) are also virtually identical when we include only observations where there is no change in the Reuters bid price between the day prior to and the day of the transaction. Bessembinder et al. (2005) include the return on a maturity-matched treasury bond and the return on the firm's equity to control for these movements. These approaches are equivalent to using a matrix price for the benchmark bid price.
The intercept in these regressions, α 0 , is the mean difference between the customer sale price and the estimated bid quote. For the full sample under the heading "All", the intercept is negative and significant, but the regressions for trade size groups show that this is largely due to the smaller trades. This indicates that for smaller trades, the Reuters bid price is greater than actual customer sale prices. The Reuters prices are largely supplied to the institutional market.
Since our estimates also reflect bid prices for smaller retail trades, it is likely that prices obtained by customers on these small customer sales are lower.
The first regression for each trade size group shows the estimated round-trip trading costs (α 1 , the coefficient on the "buy dummy" variable). We estimate these costs to be $1.71 overall, but find the same inverse relationship with trade size as documented in the previous section. The magnitude of the coefficients is also supportive of our DRT estimates. Trades of 10 bonds or less have a spread of $2.45, while spreads for trades of up to 1000 bonds have a spread of $0.48.
Interestingly, the regression adjusted R 2 s decline for larger trades, but do not appear to be related to the number of observations which remains quite large.
The second regression for each group allows us to control for additional bond characteristics related to spreads, and to observe the coefficient for our transparency variable ("disseminated bond in post-dissemination period"). As in Schultz (2001) , each additional variable is multiplied by +1 for buy and -1 for sale transactions. Results are similar when we do not assume that the spread is symmetric, i.e. including separate buy and sell dummy variables.
The coefficient on "disseminated bond in post-dissemination period" is negative and significant at the 1% level for all trade size groups except for over 1000 bonds, and indicates that spreads are lower when a bond's price is publicly disseminated. The magnitude of this coefficient is similar for all trade size groups under 100 bonds, and then begins to decline. For example, trades of 10 bonds or fewer show a decline of $0.26 for bonds that become transparent. This falls to a $0.14 decline for spreads for trade sizes from 251 to 1000 bonds, and becomes an insignificant $0.04 for the largest trades. Overall, these results in magnitude and significance support those found in Table 8b , indicating that the DRT results are not related to transaction sample selection issues as the data is reduced to include transactions that are part of a round-trip. Table 10 reports a similar set of regressions for the additional 30 disseminated thinly traded bonds and their non-disseminated control portfolio. Of concern for these bonds is that increased transparency could harm dealers' willingness to commit capital to trade a bond, for fear of having prices fall when the dealer attempts to reposition his inventory. In this scenario, dealers would demand a larger initial price concession from investors, especially at larger sizes, resulting in a higher spread. The results in the table show that this is not the case. The coefficient on "disseminated bond in post-dissemination period" is insignificant for almost all trade sizes. The only exception is for trades between 11 and 20 bonds, where bond spreads fall by $1.08, but this is only significant at the 10% level. The important result in Table 10 is the lack of support for the hypothesis that investors paid higher costs for thinly traded bonds because of the increased transparency regime. Availability of last trade price information may have little impact on our regression-based spread estimates when the last sale occurred days or weeks before. Interestingly, the spread estimates themselves are somewhat lower for the thinly traded bonds than was estimated for the 90 disseminated bonds and control portfolio in Table 9 .
Overall, we find that the magnitude of the effect of transparency on spreads varies considerably with trade size, and also depends on the pre-dissemination level of trading activity for the bond. We find that decreases in spreads range from zero to 55 basis points. These results can be contrasted with the findings of Edwards et al. (2004) who find that transparency is associated with a drop in trading costs of about 10 basis points (round-trip) across the range of trade sizes, and Bessembinder et al (2005) who find a drop of 12 to 14 basis points for trades comparable to those in our largest trade size group.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents the results of a unique controlled experiment designed to assess the impact of increased transparency on corporate bond liquidity. Examining transactions data for BBB rated corporate bonds, we investigate how trading volume and round-trip trading costs change when post-trade transparency is introduced into the market by regulatory fiat.
In general, both spreads and measures of trading activity, such as daily trading volume and number of transactions per day, either decline or show no increase. Using two alternative methods, we find evidence that spreads decrease for bonds whose prices become transparent, and Policy makers should take comfort in the results of the paper. There are few instances in the tables above that show any harm to investors from increasing transparency, and a number of examples that show how investors benefit from the change. The earliest adopters of systems providing access to TRACE data were investment professionals rather than retail investors, so that over time there may be more benefit to the retail market. There are well-founded economic models that argue that transparency should lower transactions cost, especially for smaller trades.
The results of this study should help to guide the debate over increasing transparency for securities markets. 18 To check for remaining price errors, the median monthly price is used as a baseline. Prices that exceed the baseline by more than 50% are divided by an adjustment factor that assumes the price is either off by a factor of 10 or 100. The adjustment factor is assumed to be the multiple that provides an adjusted price closest to the baseline. 19 These include incorrect entry of "Give-up" trades, and duplicate entries from undisclosed "Automatic Give-Up" trades. The "difference of the differences" is the difference of the transparency effects on the variable of interest verses the disseminated group. The t-statistic for the difference of differences normalizes volume by the opaque period level. The table reports The "difference of the differences" is the difference of the transparency effects on the variable of interest verses the disseminated group. The t-statistic for the difference of differences normalizes volume by the opaque period level. The table reports estimates of the effective bid-ask spread based on all principal trades from July 8, 2002 through February 27, 2004 for the full set of 5,503 BBB-rated corporate bonds, excluding convertibles and bonds issued by banks. Estimates are formed by identifying dealer round-trips for a given bond as chain of a customer sale to a dealer followed by a sale by the same dealer to a customer. For Panel A, the entire chain is completed in one day; for Panel B, the entire change is completed in no more than 5 days. Spreads are calculated as the difference between the customer buy price at the end of the chain and the customer sell price at the beginning of the chain. The number of observations is the number of customer/dealer/customer chains in each trade size bin. -10, 11-20, 21-50, 51-100, 101-250, 251 -1000 bonds, and more than 1000 bonds. Bids are labeled by their upper limit size. All calculations exclude agency trades and spreads of less than $0 or greater than $5. Standard errors are in parentheses. -10, 11-20, 21-50, 51-100, 101-250, 251 -1000 bonds, and more than 1000 bonds. Bids are labeled by their upper limit size. All calculations exclude agency trades and spreads of less than $0 or greater than $5. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Appendix: Data cleaning and sample construction

